De Montfort marched east
from Hereford on the 2nd August. He crossed the Severn to the south of the
heavily fortified city of Worcester, which Edward controlled. He may have
used the bridge at Upton, 9 miles to the south, as later armies would do
in comparable situations. However Cox has suggested that de Montfort used
a ferry at Clevelode, 4 miles closer to Worcester. That night de Montfort
quartered at Kempsey, just 4 miles south of the city, presumably intending
to challenge Edward, once his son’s army arrived. But Edward had already
taken the initiative, marching for Kenilworth on the night of the 1st
August, having first feigned a march north towards Shrewsbury with his
infantry and baggage. It was probably only the cavalry which rode the 30
miles to Kenilworth. The surprise attack early on the morning of the 2nd
caught part of the rebel army encamped outside the castle. Although de
Montfort’s son escaped to the castle, still retaining a proportion of his
army, Edward had turned the tables. Immediately Edward returned to
Worcester to deal with de Montfort.
On the 3rd, or possibly
as late as the 4th August, once he had the news of his son’s defeat, de
Montfort marched east, intending to unite with his son’s remaining forces.
He may have crossed the Avon at Pershore, putting the river between
himself and Edward, who was already probably shadowing the rebel army,
marching on the road on the north side of the river. De Montfort probably
reached Evesham on the morning of the 4th, while his son was en route for
Alcester, intending to approach Evesham from the north.
What happened next is
subject to considerable dispute, deriving from the original accounts,
especially that of Mathew Paris. This suggest that Edward crossed the Avon
and closed the route to Kenilworth and then that the three divisions, of
Edward, Clare and Mortimer, approach from three directions encircling de
Montfort. This has been long interpreted as a manoeuvre to encircle the
town and has led to varied scenarios being described by authors for the
late 19th century onwards. According to Prothero, Ramsay, Burne and
others, Edward divided his forces and encompassed Evesham in three
separate division. They argue that he blocked the way to Kenilworth at
Clive, identified as Cleeve Prior some miles to the north east of the
town. Then Clare and Edward approached from the north to close the
Alcester route, while Mortimer advanced on the east side of the Avon to
block the bridge from Evesham at Bengeford. Carpenter, in 1987, following
the interpretation of Pearson and Oman, differed only in suggesting that
Mortimer advanced from the west to Bengeworth.
Burne argued that this
division of forces was an exceptional and bold strategy with little
parallel in medieval warfare; a sign of the brilliance of Edward as a
military commander. Cox has argued, very convincingly, that in fact no
such division of forces took place and that the chronicles have been
misinterpreted. He has suggested that Edward’s whole army approached the
battlefield along the Worcester road and deployed close to a place called
Siveldston, which he identifies as Siflaed’s stone, on the east side of
Greenhill, beside the Salt Street to Offenham bridge. The march via Cleeve
and the blocking of Evesham bridge are both dismissed. Carpenter had
countered the arguments, but now Cox’s interpretation would appear to have
received dramatic support from the recent discovery of a new account,
published by Labordiere et al, which shows that Edward’s forces assembled
at Mosham Meadow, between the Avon and the Worcester road, and then
marched on Evesham.
De
Montfort appears to have posted lookouts in the tower of the Abbey church
in Evesham and his barber, Nicholas, an expert in heraldry, recognised the
banners of the advancing troops as those of de Montfort’s son. But it soon
became plain that this had been a ruse by Prince Edward, who had displayed
the banners captured at Kenilworth. Even when de Montfort realised the
truth he would not take the opportunity to flee, instead choosing to ride
out and confront the enemy, despite being heavily outnumbered. His
last hope was that his son’s army would arrive to turn the tables, but in
fact they were still miles away, en route via Alcester. Unless he had been
wholly decieved by Edward's ruse, it is difficult to understand why de
Montfort did not attempt some delaying tactic to give his son time to
reach the field before he engaged.
