Wednesday October 22, 2008

Traditionally the monarch occupied the post of honour in the centre of a  deployed army so it was unusual for the King to place his command on the Royalist left with Earl Richard of Cornwall (the King’s Brother) commanding the centre and the right, commanded by Prince Edward, solely made up of cavalry. Whether this was planned, or was simply an expedient forced on the Royalists by a rushed and untidy deployment, is unclear.

Although substantially outnumbered Simon de Montfort deployed his men in the conventional three units or battles, each under its own commander, retaining a reserve of cavalry to block breeches, protect the flanks or to exploit any opportunities the Royalists afforded him.  Keeping such a reserve was innovative for the period; later Edward I would use it successfully.

Prince Edward would have watched earl Simon’s deployment from the top of Lewes Castle would have seen the deployment of most of De Montfort’s army.

The plan may have been for Edward to lead his cavalry against de Segrave’s Londoners on de Montfort’s left flank and he deployed far ahead of the main Royalist force ready for a sudden dash.  If Edward’s cavalry had smashed the weak left flank of de Montfort’s army, he would then have been able to fall on the bleeding flank and roll up the rebel line while they were fully engaged to the front by his father.  If this was the plan it was a good one in theory, but (as Prince Rupert was once told) “there is no such thing in the field”. 

There are accounts of the battle but, in accordance with the traditions of the day, hard evidence is absent.  The received wisdom is that the rebels had deployed on the downs overlooking Lewes by dawn and that battle commenced around 6.00–7.00 a.m. with Prince Edward’s cavalry scattering de Segrave’s Londoners and routing the rebel left.

The account of a chronicler of the day Matthew of Westminster says:

“But Edward got among the forces of the Londoners, and pursued them when flying, and letting the nobles escape, he followed them, as it is said, for a distance of about four miles, inflicting on them a most lamentable slaughter. For he thirsted for their blood as a punishment for the insult they had offered his mother.”

De Segrave retreated towards Offham where there are now chalk pits that yielded masses of human remains.  Further pits were found behind what are conjectured to be the Royalist lines.  It was common practice to dig pits near the bulk of bodies so that they could simply be dragged and dumped in the pits as quickly as possible.  The pits behind the Royalist lines might indicate that the fiercest fighting took place here.  However, it might fix the position where large numbers of troops were killed in exploitation of Montfortian victory.   

Earl Simon had seen his left flank stripped away.  Historians have traditionally argued which of two options he favoured to retrieve the situation.  He might hold his position, rally his men and fight a defensive battle on the elevated ground of the Downs.  Alternatively, he could take the fight to the Royalists and attack their infantry. Some historians argue that de Montfort advanced his forces while the Royalists remained in place defending the town of Lewes. The forces of Henry de Montfort (earl Simon’s son) are said to have faced the King’s men while the Earl of Gloucester faced the Royalist forces in the centre under the Earl of Cornwall.  The Royalist centre is said to have fled after a brief exchange of blows, leaving the King isolated and vulnerable while earl Simon swung his reserve onto the King’s left flank.

Other historians argue that earl Simon had just seen his largely infantry-based forces devastated by Edward’s cavalry so it was unlikely that he would surrender his position of advantage and descend into open cavalry country.  If Edward had not continued the pursuit very far he would have been in a position to return to the battlefield and clasp earl Simon’s army in the classic pincer movement.

However, Dr David Carpenter has devised a third solution. If the Royalist infantry were encouraged by the success of their cavalry and swept forward  towards the rebels then the rebels, if they kept their nerve and discipline they could have advanced smartly down the hill and hit the disorganised Royalist infantry with staggering force. 

The lie of the land afforded de Montfort a much clearer view of the battlefield than the King enjoyed; Henry would have lost sight of Cornwall’s centre as soon as he entered the spur of the hill.  Cornwall is said to have broken almost immediately as the Rebels charged down the hill and pushed him back. Earl Simon was in a position to see where to deploy his reserve and would have chosen this time to outflank the King.

The King is said by all commentators to have given a good account of himself, personally laying about him in the thick of the battle and may suggest that he had abandoned control of the battle.  The melee was ferocious.  Simon de Montfort’s standard bearer was killed and the King was reported to have had two horses killed under him.  The King’s Justiciar, Philip Basset, is said to have suffered more than 20 wounds before he fell.

Matthew of Westminster describes the impressive array of Royal troops but administers stinging criticism to practically everybody in the Royalist army:

“…the greater number of them being false and factious, and destitute of all proper principle, marched on that day without any order, and without precipitation, and fought unskilfully and showed no steady perseverance …and in the actual battle the noblest of knights and esquires, to the number of about three hundred, lost all courage, and turning their backs, fled to the castle…”

This is effectively the end of the battle; the rebels held the field, but had in no way decisively defeated the King.