As it
turned out, the king's hurried movement had no adequate object. Having
relieved Rochester, he might again have turned towards London, though with
less advantage, since he was now separated from it by the broad reaches of
the Lower Thames. But this did not enter into his plan of operations. he
marched instead against Tunbridge, a great castle of the Earl of
Gloucester, and when it fell with unexpected ease (May 1st) moved still
farther from London, with the object of overawing
the coast-towns.3 But the
barons of the Cinque Ports had sent their fleet and their armed force to
sea, and Henry obtained nothing but a few hostages from Winchelsea and
Romney. His next move was still more inexplicable, he pushed westward
between the Weald and the sea, and marched by Battle and Hurstmonceaux to
Lewes. No object seems to have been served by this turn, save that of
placing himself in the midst of the estates of his brother-in-law and firm
supporter, De Warenne. It had the disadvantage of putting the almost
trackless forest of the Weald between himself and London, and of causing
his army much discomfort as they threaded their way through the
wood-tracks-for the men of Kent and Sussex cut off his stragglers and
plundered his baggage, and a detachment of Welsh archers, whom Montfort
had sent forward from London, are said to have molested the rear of
the host.4 The king's object is impossible to
fathom, more especially as we are told that he feared that his enemies
would strike at Tunbridge when he had marched off, and therefore
garrisoned that castle with a very large force; no less than twenty
bannerets and many of his foreign men-at-arms are said to have been left
there.
De
Montfort and the barons, however, had no intention of wasting their time
in sieges when they could strike at the main objective, the king's army.
Having collected every available man, and armed a great body of the
citizens of London, they marched across Surrey, plunged into the paths of
the Weald, and did not halt till they had reached Fletching, a village and
clearing nine miles north of Lewes (May 6th-10th). From thence they
addressed proposals for peace to the king, dated with prudent vagueness
'in bosco juxta Lewes." They must have known well enough that Henry would
refuse them, after his late successes at Northampton and Tunbridge, and on
receiving his angry reply prepared for instant action. Although he had the
smaller force, Simon was resolved to take the initiative, trusting to his
own skill, the greater enthusiasm of his supporters, and the king's
well-tried incapacity in war.
The
town and castle of Lewes lie at a point where the line of the South Downs
is cut through by the river Ouse. To the east of the place the steep sides
of Mount Caburn rise directly above the water, hardly leaving room for the
suburb of Cliffe along the river-bank. To the west of the Ouse there lies
a mile and a half of gently-undulating ground before the ascent of the
Downs begins. In this comparatively level spot lies the town of Lewes,
flanked to the north by De Warenne 's castle on its lofty mound, to the
south by the great Cluniac Priory of St. Pancras, including within its
precinct-wall some twenty acres of ground. The Ouse in the thirteenth
century was still a tidal river as far north as Lewes, and at high water
the south wall of the priory and the southern houses of the town looked
out on a stretch of mingled pools and mud-banks which formed an impassable
obstacle.
North
and east, therefore, Lewes is protected by the river, and on the south by
this tidal marsh, but to the west it had no protection but the castle and
the priory wall. If an enemy approached from that side, the king's army
would have either to defend the streets, or to retire behind the Ouse, or
to come out and fight at the foot of the hills.
